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of the term "difficult case"24 5 and the
question must necessarily
246
be determined on a case-by-case basis.
UDCA § 204: District court has jurisdiction to determine right
to possession although issue of title is raised.
Mohar Realty Co. V. Smith247 involved a summary proceeding,
in the District Court of Suffolk County, to recover possession of
realty. Defendant, raising title as an issue, obtained a dismissal
on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The supreme
court unanimously reversed, holding that the district court has
jurisdiction to entertain summary proceedings to recover possession
of real property and that the defense involving a question of title
did not divest the court of jurisdiction.
Of course, the district courts have no jurisdiction over real
property actions, including actions to determine title. But the
courts do have jurisdiction of summary proceedings concerning real
property and they are not ousted from their jurisdiction merely
because one of the parties raises an issue of title. When questions
of title are raised in summary proceedings, the courts only have to
determine whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists,
and then they can award possession to the party entitled to the
premises.2 S In such cases, title is considered only collaterally in
issue and the courts may pass upon it to determine which party
has the present right to possession. As long as the main issue,
therefore, concerns the recovery of possession,
the courts also may
249
pass upon the collateral issue of title.
CCA § 212:

Reinstatement of evicted tenant.

Section 212 of the New York City Civil Court Act states:
"in the exercise of its jurisdiction the court shall have all of the
powers that the supreme court would have in like actions and
proceedings." This provision was not intended to increase or diminish the jurisdiction of the court.25 0 This construction, however,
245

Addamo v. Scaturro, 41 Misc. 2d 60, 244 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. City
Civil Ct. 1963).
246 See 8 WENsTmx, KoiRN & MuLERF, NEW YomK CIVIw
PRAcricE 18303.12
(1965).
247 46 Misc. 2d 849, 260 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1965).
248 Drake v. Cunningham, 127 App. Div. 79, 111 N.Y. Supp. 199 (2d
Dep't 1908) ; Quinn v. Quinn, 46 App. Div. 241, 61 N.Y. Supp. 684 (2d Dep't
1899) ; Dorsehel v. Burkly, 41 N.Y. Supp. 389 (App. Term 1st Dep't
1896).
249 E.g., Blumenauer v. Richelson, 219 App. Div. 462, 219 N.Y. Supp.
612 (3d Dep't 1927); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 212 App. Div. 531, 208 N.Y.
Supp. 734 (4th Dep't 1925); People v. Goldfogle, 30 N.Y. Supp. 296
(Sup.
25 Ct. N.Y. County 1894).
029A McKINxnvs CCA § 212, commentary 68 (1963).
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appears to have been rejected by the New York City Civil Court
which liberally interpreted McLeod v. Shapiro,251 wherein the appellate division, first department, combining CCA § 212 and CPLR
as the supreme
2201, stated that the civil court had the same power 252
court with respect to granting a stay of proceedings.
This liberal interpretation was manifested in two recent civil
court decisions involving the question of whether a tenant could
obtain reinstatement if wrongfully evicted even though another
tenant might be in-possession. In the first case, Marluted Realty
Corp. v. Decker,253 the court, faced with a landlord-tenant conflict
declared, in dicta, that CCA § 212 granted to the court new or
additional powers in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, the
court announced that it has the power to reinstate a tenant wrongfully evicted although a new tenant might be in possession since
the supreme court has the power to do so by virtue of its broad
equity jurisdiction. 254

The court reasoned that this would remedy

situations where under prior law the court could only decide whether
the tenant was entitled to possession. The tenant if he desired
reinstatement, would be required to seek this remedy in the appellate
term or the supreme court, thereby being subjected to additional
delay and expense.
The court, however, was doubtful as to whether it had the
power to reinstate a tenant wrongfully evicted, expressing the
hope that an appeal might be taken so that the higher courts could
render a decision. The court was not confronted with the problem
of transferring possession of the premises since at the time of trial
the original tenant had ousted the new tenant and had actual
possession. The court noted that the original tenant has the right
to dispossess the new tenant immediately if he can do so peacefully. 55
The court's statements in Marluted concerning reinstatement,
although merely dicta, formed the basis for its subsequent holding
in Albany v. White. 25 6 In that case, the plaintiff-tenant brought
an action for reinstatement, asking the court to set aside the final
judgment and the executed warrant. The dispossessed tenant claimed
that he sent past rent to the landlord and did not receive notice
that the landlord refused to accept payment. At the time of trial
25120
2

App. Div. 2d 424, 247 N.Y.S2d 423 (lst Dep't 1964).

§ 2102.
See 29A McKINNm's CCA §212, supp. commentary 16 (1965).
253 46 Misc. 2d 736, 260 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. 1965).
254 The court cited N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1; N.Y. Junic. LA-w § 140-b;
CPLR 5015(b), 5523, 6301, 6311.
255 Under the common-law rule, a person wrongfully dispossessed could take
possession by force. Although today in New York it is a misdemeanor under
New York Penal Law § 2034 to use violence to repossess the premises, the
question remains whether peaceful repossession is permitted, especially where
there is a new tenant in possession. •
215846 Misc. 2d 915, 261 N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. 1965).
25 The civil court, in granting the stay, could have used CCA
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the premises were not relet. Under prior law the courts had generally held that they had no power to vacate a warrant or open
a default because once the landlord-tenant relationship was terminated there was no basis for jurisdiction.25 7 The court in Albany,
construing CCA § 212 in the same manner as in Marluted, reasoned
that since the supreme court has the power to reinstate a tenant
wrongfully evicted, the civil court has the same power. This
statutory construction resulted in the setting aside of an executed
warrant and an ordering that the tenant be immediately restored
to possession of the premises.
Assuming that the supreme court has the power to reinstate a
tenant wrongfully evicted,2 it is highly questionable whether the
civil court has the same power. Under prior law, upon the dissolution of the landlord-tenant relationship the court's jurisdiction
terminated, and with it, the power to grant the necessary relief.
Thus, once the warrant was executed, the court had no jurisdictiorr
to open the tenant's default and vacate the warrant. 25 9 In fact,
RPAPL § 749(3) explicitly states that "the issuing of a warrant
for the removal of a tenant . . . annuls the relation of landlord
and tenant." Yet, the civil court, in order to achieve an equitable
result, thought that the right to direct reinstatement was merely a
power given to it under CCA § 212 and that it was not exceeding
its jurisdictional limits. Since the prior law, however, appears to
have considered the relief granted in Albany as outside the jurisdiction of the municipal courts, it is extremely doubtful that the
civil court was exercising a power only and not exceeding its
limited jurisdiction.
Another difficulty remains, due to the civil court's implied
approval of the ousting of the new tenant as long as it is done by
"peaceful means." This could lead to a do-it-yourself type of
justice whereby two tenants, both innocent, are at odds, although
the landlord is the party who should be held ultimately responsible.
These problems demand clarification and resolution by the courts.

257 E.g., Gooden v. Galashaw, 42 Misc. 2d 8, 247 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y.
City Civil Ct. 1964); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. McShane, 184 Misc.
579, 56 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1945). See RPAPL § 749.
253 It is questionable whether the supreme court has the jurisdiction to
reinstate a tenant wrongfully evicted. CPA § 1002, permitting restoration of
property to persons paying rent in arrears, was repealed. In addition, it is
questionable whether a final order of redemption issued to a tenant entities
him to reinstatement even assuming that a new tenant is not in possession.
See Terwiliger v. Browning, 152 App. Div. 552, 137 N.Y. Supp. 572 (3d
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 207 N.Y. 47 (1912).
259 Gooden v. Galashaw, supra note 257.

